What are the leading forces and ideas that are shaping our age? In the West, a decade of financial disruption, austerity, and stagnant wages has produced a popular rejection of market fundamentalism that prevailed for over forty years. Mass immigration and multiculturalism have contributed to rapid changes in both family and community life that leave many people feeling dispossessed or even humiliated. Unresponsive government is exacerbating peopleÕs sense of powerlessness and anger. The revolt against the status quo is fuelling a political insurgency against the establishment that replaces the old opposition of left versus right with a similarly simplistic dichotomy pitting the people against the elites. We are witnessing the failure of dualistic thinking and this will not be resolved by substituting one binary for another.
The first task in crafting such a public philosophy is to conceptualize the times we are living in.
Antonio Gramsci calls this an analysis of the Ôconjuncture,Õ which he defines as the events, social factors, and economic interests that shape society at any given moment in its history.
1 A political settlement emerges when these forces broadly align. Since the conjuncture is in flux, each political settlement is not fixed and it is only dominant if it converges with what Gramsci calls the Ôsituation,Õ which he defines as deeper organic trends and historical forces that structure the foundations of society Ð moral, cultural and social issues as well as class interests.
2 Gramsci calls such a convergence between conjuncture and situation ÔhegemonyÕ: political domination beyond the state and the market into the realm of culture and society. At any moment rival political forces contest the meaning of the dominant settlement in what Gramsci calls a Ôwar of movement.Õ Once a settlement is no longer hegemonic and in crisis, politics enters an ÔinterregnumÕ when the political contest shifts to a Ôwar of positionÕ that is a battle over ideas, common sense, organization, and leadership.
Our contemporary conjuncture is such a period of interregnum and a war of position between the hitherto hegemonic ideology of liberalism and its populist rivals. The popular revolt against liberalism, which is driving the political insurgency across the West, highlights the collapse of the authority of the professional political class dominated by liberals. 3 In GramsciÕs words, ÒIf the ruling class has lost consensus, that is, if it no longer "leads" but only "rules" Ð it possesses sheer coercive power Ð this actually means that the great masses have become detached from traditional ideologies.Ó 4 The breakdown of peopleÕs trust in mainstream politics points to a deeper crisis that reveals a divergence between the current conjuncture and the wider situation: ÒThe crisis consists 3 precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass.Ó 5 These morbid phenomena encompass the failure of liberalism and the limits of populism because, as I shall argue, both rest on an antihumanist logic.
The anti-liberal insurgency has shaken liberals or even dislodged them from power, but it has not and likely will not defeat liberalism altogether. Gramsci suggests that the previously hegemonic forces try to resolve conjunctural contradictions within the limits defined by the political settlement:
A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves (reached maturity), and that despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure are making every effort to cure them, within certain limits, and to overcome them. 6 Faced with the loss of its hegemonic status, the professional political class led by liberals is desperately trying to contain the populist insurgency. But in a deliberate inversion of GramsciÕs argument, it is in reality the new that is dead and the old that is yet to be revitalized. The failure of liberalism means that we are witnessing the demise of the New Left, the New Right, and their convergence around the liberalisms that shaped the dominant political settlements in recent history:
the Ôembedded liberalismÕ of the post-war consensus, the social liberalism since the 1960s and the economic liberalism since the 1980s. 7 The death of the new marks the end of the liberal hegemony because the assumptions of liberalism defy the common sense of the people and liberals struggle to assemble a coalition of estranged groups through which it can lead rather than simply rule.
In our times when the old consensus of the new is dead and a renewal of older traditions is yet to occur, the democratic contest is over which ideology can offer a Ônational popular politics.Õ Gramsci describes this rather vaguely as an alignment of popular aspirations with national culture.
Intellectuals Ð including politicians, party members and all those active in politics Ð play an important role of mediating guidance in bringing together people and the nation into a unified political form, something that he calls the Ôpeople-nation.Õ The task is to combine feeling with knowledge in ways that generate mutual understanding and avoid extremes: ÒThe popular element "feels" but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element "knows", but does not always understand and, above all, does not feel. The two extremes, therefore, are pedantry and philistinism on the one hand and blind passion and sectarianism on the other.Ó In what follows I shall argue that the emergent ideologies which are vying for hegemony are hyperliberalism, nationalist traditionalism, and tech utopianism. All of them are variously anti-humanist, to which one can oppose updated versions of one-nation conservatism and ethical socialism. Before setting out the unfolding Ôwar of position,Õ I will first explore the new anti-humanism that underpins the main ideological movements.
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The surrender of the human
As the British MP and political thinker Jon Cruddas has argued, the character of politics has shifted from a sense of sacrificial contribution to the common life based on the struggles of representative democracy and collective agency to a culture of victimhood, a movement politics of protest, and narcissistic online echo chambers of what we do and do not like. 9 At the hands of the revolutionary left and the radical right, identity politics is now joining forces with technological determinism and anti-humanism that rest on the same logic of rejecting natural law, fetishizing transgression and embracing the nihilism of Ôdark enlightenmentÕ disguised as a liberating tech utopia. 10 This marks the surrender of universal human nature, the dignity of the person, and with it the pursuit of the common good based on mutual flourishing and the building of a just society.
Hating the liberal model of capitalist globalization, the resurgent extremes seek to institute an alternative modernity that is anti-liberal but in reality an intensification of certain modern liberal ideas: the cult of the individual, an invocation of the Ôwill of the people,Õ the unmediated power of techno-science, and a non-teleological cosmos in which both nature and humanity will be replaced Ð or, to use the ÔaccelerationistÕ language of deception, ÔenhancedÕ Ð by a new Promethean spirit.
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Prometheanism combines a naturalist philosophy in which reality has no purpose with a materialist politics driven by economic and technological forces Ð a belief it shares with accelerationist between Ônew ageÕ fanaticism and science fiction. ÔIf you love life, extend it into the vanishing ether of cyber-realityÕ seems to be the transhumanistsÕ oddly life-denying motto. wealth and power. In 2017, two-thirds of the total number of sectors across developed economies were characterized by a greater concentration of ownership and control than in 1997, including old monopolistic industries such as tobacco, food, construction, retail, the car industry, and Wall
Street.
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The new cartels include the tech giants of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and the Chinese conglomerate Alibaba, which are modern-day plutocracies with such dominant market positions that they can take over their online competitors and eat the traditional retail world.
Oligarchic power undermines both economic competition and democracy. By managing access to information and knowledge, Facebook and Google exercise control over public debate in ways that
threaten not just open markets but free speech and democratic argument. There is an online feedback loop optimized for manipulation: make money on Google, and then spend the proceeds on paid ads propaganda via Facebook. commentator Ross Douthat goes further than Lilla to suggest that people have a desire for solidarity that cosmopolitanism does not satisfy, immaterial interests that redistribution cannot meet, a yearning for the sacred that secularism cannot answer [É] . A deeper vision than mere liberalism is still required Ð something like "for God and home and country," as reactionary as that phrase may sound. It is reactionary, but then it is precisely older, foundational things that todayÕs liberalism has lost. Until it finds them again, it will face tribalism within its coalition and Trumpism from without, and it will struggle to tame either. Liberalism is no longer hegemonic but it remains the default position of (former) This movement combines economic nationalism (ÔAmerica FirstÕ) with an appeal to traditionalist values, which is diametrically opposed to the New RightÕs fusion of economic globalism with social conservatism. But neither is conservative because both rest on certain libertarian ideas and deploy revolutionary means to achieve their ambition of hegemony. The New RightÕs embrace of the unfettered global free-market as the main mode of social organization undermined community cohesion and the family that it professed to uphold. Nationalist traditionalismÕs state capture to smash the establishment has strengthened the Ôbig governmentÕ that it promised to abolish. Neither ideology is conservative because both have entrenched the power of corporate money in politics and consolidated the oligarchic hold over democracy.
Nationalist traditionalism is a more accurate characterization of the rightwing insurgency than The people who do so not only misunderstand them; they risk making the problem worse, because it provides them with the ammunition that the liberal elites are trying to silence them.Ó 35 Crucially, Bartlett notes that new movements and their ability to mobilize people offer some form of common purpose and even belonging absent from mainstream professional politics Ð replacing Òthe empty consumerism, the crap precarious jobs, the fragmented communities. In a strange way, they are a form of the Ôidentity politicsÕ they claim to dislike to much.Ó 36 Hyper-liberalism is exacerbating the worst aspects of nationalist traditionalism Ð including a mix of libertarians, Ôalt-righters,Õ and farright white supremacists Ð because it reinforces popular distrust in mainstream media and politicians who are widely perceived to ignore concerns about the levels of immigration and the loss of settled ways of life.
One-nation conservatism
The other ideology that is challenging the liberal right is one-nation conservatism. Ômunicipal socialismÕ promoted by Timothy) and also a strategic role for central government to invest in housing, research and development, and high-tech manufacturing.
Until she lost her majority and authority, MayÕs aim was to replace ThatcherÕs and OsborneÕs trickle-down economics with a form of distributism by raising wages and sharing assets Ð not oldstyle top-down redistribution through tax-and-spend. With proper organization and leadership, she could have been the first Conservative leader in nearly forty years to reject GladstoneÕs ÔWhig conservatismÕ with its emphasis on the unfettered market and self-help in favor of an updated version of ÔHigh ToryismÕ with its focus on national unity, mutual assistance, unconditional support of the truly needy and a measure of protectionism.
However, one-nation conservatism is in an impasse over championing global free trade while also trying to build a more social market at home. Unrestricted free trade on the global market without regional tariff agreements is likely to hurt the very workers that one-nation conservatives claim to defend when, like May, they speak of an Ôeconomy for the many, not the privileged few.Õ Workers may be appeased by promised restrictions on immigration, but may become less so when these restrictions fail to materialize (more free trade with the rest of the world will lead to more economic migrants from abroad) and living standards continue to stagnate. Moreover, a likely desperate recourse to the most uninhibited global exponents of financial and business practice could prove incompatible with the forging of a domestic social market. Nor, given the nature of globalization, is it easy to achieve this in one country acting alone.
And on the other hand, while there is a role for selective and temporary state protection for certain sectors, it is worth remembering that protectionism, in understandable reaction to the unequal predations of Ôfree trade,Õ has almost always reinforced inter-state conflict. It also fails to match the operation of capital at the global level where more targeted political cooperation is needed to encourage a model of globalization which works for all. Regional organizations, such as ASEAN, Mercosur, or the EU Ð which establish privileged trade access under agreed rules between a group of nations Ð offer precisely the Ôthird wayÕ between free-trade and protection that tends to promote international pacification.
Meanwhile, one-nation conservative ideas for domestic renewal are not consistent. Although rightly motivated by a desire to give better opportunities to children from low-income families, the commitment to ever-more social mobility is too limited an ideal. It needs to be supplemented by a recognition that most people will not prove clear Ôwinners.Õ A problem with mere meritocracy, as the Brexit vote and the election of Trump suggest, is that it breeds a dangerous resentment amongst the many who carry out necessary but unglamorous tasks, and remain valuably rooted in one place.
These people also deserve adequate, comfortable provision and a sense of dignity and respect consequent upon appreciation for their service.
A more genuinely Burkean perspective beyond liberalism would involve a search for a restored sense of belonging for all, for more holistic fulfillment in work (in resistance to the creeping proletarianization of labor) and for the combining of work with the needs of family and community.
This idea of a balance of interests at the service of the common good also points the way to a more ethical economy. Instead of offering mere compensation for the side-effects of globalization, a true one-nation conservative approach has to focus on injecting social purpose into economic profit.
The point is to provide fundamental reforms, which would begin to change the nature of the market itself by aligning the executive with the long-term interests of the company, its shareholders, employers, consumers, and communities where businesses operate. This would go beyond mere representation of workers on company boards, which is nevertheless important and welcome.
Virtuous entrepreneurship, if undertaken with integrity and not just for instrumental purpose, can help increase profit and remuneration because it promotes innovation and productivity through employee retention, job satisfaction, and participation in the workplace. The test of one-nation conservatism will be whether it can truly avoid either liberal economism or liberal statism by forging such a social market. As with nationalist traditionalism, either a purely buccaneering approach to globalization or a xenophobic soft-fascism at home would be likely to ensure a backsliding in either respective direction.
Tech utopianism (and retro leftism)
A very different challenge to the domination of hyper-liberalism comes from the far left side of the political spectrum in the form of tech utopianism, which builds partly on accelerationist ideas and The future of society belongs to a higher educated caste of information workers. Their taxes will pay for a universal basic income to support a redundant, workless working class. History will move rapidly toward human perfection by computer power and the mastery of the new historical subject. The totalitarian implications can be overlooked. anti-war mobilization, Occupy, on-campus agitation, and now the protest politics of Syriza, Podemos, and Momentum.
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Common to post-operaismo and accelerationist post-capitalism is the belief in a future economy without work or workers driven by a process of technological de-materialization that replaces the physical world of manufacturing and industry with the virtual reality of knowledge, information, and other intangible assets. It also replaces the political economy of land, labor, and capital with a new knowledge economy of networks, leisure, and transferable skills. As the old workers become the new self-employed entrepreneurs (or, alternatively, the lazy leisure class), the wage-labor conflict at the heart of capitalism withers away and with it the class system.
If this sounds eerily like the social-democratic liberalism of Clinton and Blair, it is because Ð as both Cruddas and Rutherford point out Ð tech utopians agree with social-democrat liberals that the future of the left lies in a shift away from the working-class and the labor interest towards the middle-class urban salariat and the globalized, networked youth. They also share a retreat behind variants of neo-classical economics, which is a simplified version of Hayek and Keynes respectively. Whereas Ôthird-wayÕ liberals in the 1990s privatized, deregulated, liberalized, and redistributed some small proceeds from corporate capitalism, the tech utopians harken back to the 1970s in their desire to tax the tech giants, borrow billions for centralized bureaucracy, and nationalize vast swaths of industry. Underpinning their shared neo-classical economics is a utilitarian and deontological model of justice. Both view just social relations in terms of utilitymaximization and rights-based welfare. Concretely, they combine GDP growth, which is seen as the best means to achieve Ôthe greatest happiness of the great numbers,Õ with the provision of individual entitlements that are disconnected from contribution and increasingly rationalized by the managerial state. Social-democratic liberalism is a model of Kantian ethics of context-less duties with Millian liberty and Weberian rationalist statecraft. For its part, tech utopianism fuses Benthamite calculus with a heavy dose of Fabian centralism and a Trotskyst embrace of Ôpermanent revolutionÕ against the working-class.
Crucially, neither social-democratic liberalism nor tech utopianism offer the left any prospect of intellectual renewal in the hope of replacing the hegemony of the liberal right or the nationalisttraditionalist insurgency. The reason is that both fail to challenge the fundamental logic of contemporary capitalism Ð the cultural conditions as well as the economic workings that involve destruction and dispossession through the concentration of wealth and power as well as the commodification of everyday life. The capitalist economy destroys human attachment to, and affections for, relationships and institutions by re-embedding them in impersonal transactions. Such an economy abstracts people and production from value and treats everyone and everything as a commodity with a market price.
The reason for this blindness about capitalism is that both ideologies are grounded in a philosophy of abstraction from our embodied humanity and from our embedding in nature. As Cruddas argues, social-democratic liberalism and tech utopianism rest on statism, rationalized welfare, technological determinism, hyper-individualism, abstract cosmopolitanism, a libertarian conception of freedom to opt out from work and citizenship, passive consumerism, a denial of agency, and an anti-humanism dressed up as techno-scientific enhancement. 44 The organizational energy of new movement-parties and the charisma of their leaders cannot mask the unthinking orthodoxy that prevents an intellectual renaissance, which is necessary for a leftwing counter-hegemony.
Here the lessons from Bernie SandersÕ politics provide some building blocks for a renewal of the left. First of all, he struck a chord with the disaffected working class precisely because he connected the fate of the Rust Belt factory workers to that of people in the public sector and the services industry, speaking of shared interests and values in ways that bound them to the struggling middle- 44 Cruddas, ÔThe humanist left must challenge the rise of cyborg socialism.Õ class. Second, Sanders led a political insurgency that was positive, offering hope and transformative action to a broad coalition of working families: 45 pro-worker and pro-small business, promising criminal justice reform plus Medicare for all; better social care plus free college tuition. Third, his critique of AmericaÕs Ôrigged systemÕ was informed by a conception of justice that transcends individual freedoms-as-rights and collective utility in the direction of the common good.
But much of this was under-developed and got lost in an acrimonious contest for the Democratic nomination, in which the Sanders campaign was arguably guilty of virtue-signaling its moral superiority and accusing the Clinton campaign of underhand tactics. In turn, the Clinton machine was guilty of virtue-signaling her experience and dismissing the Sanders candidacy as protest rather than a serious attempt to gain power and govern the country. So far Sanders and the Democrats have failed to articulate an alternative to ClintonÕs hyper-liberalism that not only replaces the global free-market with a moral economy but can also build a common good politics based on a balance between individual rights and mutual obligations.
Ethical socialism
With its roots in the traditions of Romantic philosophy, the guild and cooperative movement, as well as Christian social teaching, ethical socialism has the conceptual resources to develop a renewed public philosophy based on a moral critique of capitalism and the re-imagination of a just social order. Romanticism is central to such a project because it sought to chart an alternative modernity around nature, human creativity, and the imagination, which outflanks the binary divide between the rationalist and empiricist strands of the Enlightenment by binding reason to habit, feeling, and faith. Connected with this is a wider divide in philosophy since the seventeenth century between humanism and the modern scientific revolution and the concomitant separation of economics from moral philosophy Ð whose intellectual origins go back to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, in particular the split between a metaphysics of participation and an ontology of immanence that ultimately underpins accelerationist anti-humanism. 46 This fundamental division between an ethical and an economistic outlook runs through the history of socialism both before and after Marx. Culture and society, not state and market, are the main foundations on which ethical socialism builds a politics of the common good.
One reason why Romantic philosophy is so important to the history of socialism is its traditional Crucially, virtue as a Ôprincipled practiceÕ is not found in the innermost recesses of the human mind nor can it be inductively known from experience but rather is embedded in social relationships Ð the Ôcustoms, manners, and habits of lifeÕ that shape our everyday existence, which encompasses work, capture of the state may permit a greater overriding of welfare and work protections which democratic opinion tends to resist. The marginalized masses can be bought off with militarism and protectionism, besides more extensive if more permanently degrading welfare provisions where absolutely necessary. Moreover, the state bailing out of the banks since 2008 means that a marketstate entirely subordinate to the interests of capital has now evolved into being also a state-market, for which government monopoly of both force and currency provision has become essential to the management of an economy permanently dependent on a negative cycle of debt. In this fashion, it could be that the Chinese hybrid of brutal market competition and tight state control is becoming normative rather than aberrant.
Such an Ôultra-neoliberalÕ fusion already speaks competing anti-humanist languages. On the left, we are seeing a celebration of the further blurring of the boundaries between genders, between childhood and youth, between casual and committed, and between human, animal, and machine. All these blurrings will increase human danger and erode the civic institutions and relationships of affection and attachment on which we all daily rely. The current outcry over sexual harassment is surely a symptom of this, as is the popularity of Jordan Peterson. In response, the double hydra of state and market will assume ever-more control over processes of reproduction, production, leisure and an education whose humanist basis is being abandoned in favor of transhumanism. As Jamie Bartlett reports, transhumanists in politics pursue total morphological freedom, which they views an extension of the sexual freedom that we owe to the 1960s libertarian revolution. 55 In this manner they confirm the thesis by the French novelist Michel Houellebecq that this revolution has left people atomized and increasingly incapable of forming lasting relationships, which fuels a desire for self-gratification that perpetuates this condition Ð a downward spiral of unfulfilled desire.
On the right, we are witnessing a creeping integration of Ôalt-rightÕ themes. There is a pseudoscientific return of ÔraceÕ as a supposedly objective category, with an accompanying legitimation of 55 Bartlett, Radicals, racial stereotyping and racial preference. An unabashed social Darwinism favoring neo-eugenics is also resurgent, as is a post-humanist accelerationism less constrained than that of the left, and happy to countenance the abandonment of humanity as we know it and any notions of ecological balance in favor of a fantasized cosmic reconstitution. Such a paradoxical combination can be conceptualized as a public philosophy of the common good.
In the economy, the common good signals a shift from market capitalism to economic justice and reciprocity. In society, it signals a shift from individualism to social solidarity and fraternal relations. And politically, it signals a shift from the minority politics of vested interests and balkanized group identity to a majority politics anchored in a balance of interests and a shared sense of belonging. Linking together common good economics and politics is an emphasis on the embedding of state and market in the intermediary institutions of civil society, which give people agency Ð professional associations, profit-sharing businesses, trade unions, universities, ecological groups, and devolved government.
Therefore the alternative to tech utopianism and nationalist traditionalism is not social democracy or liberal conservatism, which history has now overtaken. It would rather be ethical socialism and one-nation conservatism, or even a fusion of both in a kind of Ôconservative socialismÕ Ð combining a more just and socially purposed market with more allowance for attachments to religion, custom and place than the left has been happy with since the 1960s. Such a mode of common good politics would remain committed to a traditional humanism, whose metaphysical undergirding now, it would seem, only religion and spiritually sensitive secular traditions provide.
By contrast, an extended Trumpism would only transcend hyper-liberalism in a newly fascistic, anti-humanist and anti-traditional religion sense. Here it makes sense to invoke Michel
HouellebecqÕs novel Soumission, which is less about the dangers of creeping Islamization and much more about the idea that no society, even post-Christian Europe, can survive without religion. As one of the novelÕs characters remarks, without Christianity, the European nations are no more than bodies without souls Ð zombies. Tellingly, the novel ends by predicting that French society will get what it deserves, a state run by those who believe in something bigger than mere material wealth and cultural narcissism.
The task is to build a new cross-class, cross-cultural and cross-national alliance that can appeal to people of all faiths and none around a politics based on work, family, place and cultural belonging.
Common good politics can offer a radical middle with paradoxical combinations: a desire for fiscal discipline and greater economic justice; for further devolution of power to people and a more active role of government; for more global trade and a strategy for national renewal; for greater patriotism and a stronger international outlook. These paradoxical combinations are an indication that a politics of virtue and the common good can be popular and have majority support just because it reconciles the estranged interests Ð capital vs. labor, young vs. old, north vs. south, urban vs. rural, religious vs. secular Ð which hyper-liberals and their rivals view as diametrically opposed.
The new pivot in politics
We live in troubled times. A sense of anger and abandonment is spreading among people who feel humiliated, unable to live the lives they hope for, and powerless to shape the forces that dominate them and those they care about most. Among those forces are liberal and libertarian ideas of liberty as free choice and the pursuit of individual happiness. This is understood as including the right to terminate the lives of the older or the suffering. What is legitimated here is not a genuinely desirable democratic right but instead the will to power of some over others and essentially the strong over the weak. If the unique value of each human person is not upheld, then nothing prevents ending the lives of children and adults deemed to be too ill or too weak. This is social Darwinism under a new guise. Ironically, the science-based enlightened liberalism ends up on the same side as the Nietzschean will-to-power that liberals like Steven Pinker in his new book Enlightenment Now 36 associate with all the evils of modernity. 57 Thus the humanist foundations of equality and dignity are once again under attack.
Both libertarian and liberal thinking points towards a new form of biological totalitarianism based on a refusal of all value except the will of the individual. Neither the liberal centre nor the resurgent extremes have learned the lessons of Aldous HuxleyÕs warnings about totalitarian temptations in Brave New World. A control over reproduction is now more easily attained through self-release and promiscuity than self-discipline and fidelity. This allows the state to deal with the individual directly, rather than through the mediation of couples and families, which can offer more resistance to central intervention. Much of liberal feminism and minority rights activism too readily colludes with this underlying reality. These movements also embrace the commodification of human reproduction, which becomes a matter of contractual exchange Ð as with surrogacy. Precisely because such matters raise complex ethical questions, economic-social liberalism with its cult of pure individual rights or an outright denial of human dignity altogether is insufficient. Moreover, it is too rarely noticed that sexual permissiveness has today, as Huxley already noted in his dystopian novel, become a kind of opiate that covertly reconciles people to the loss of other freedoms Ð at the workplace, in the locality and beyond. This is not to overlook real social progress. Women and minorities are freer and have more rights and opportunities than before. All the discrimination that persists is a denial of human equality on which humanism rests. At the same time, greater personal autonomy coincides with a growing sense of peopleÕs powerlessness. Liberalism and libertarianism have liberated us from bonds of family, community and nation but the impersonal mechanisms of state and market that have replaced those interpersonal ties leave most of us at once free yet lacking in agency. The vision of humanity shared by liberals and libertarians offers freedom of choice, yet subordinates people to forces that cannot be governed democratically and that disregard dignity and human flourishing. Yet behind the isolated 57 Steven Pinker, Enlightenment Now: the case for reason, science, humanism, and progress (New York: Penguin, 2018 ).
